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Abstract
This study analyzes the interactions among mandated
change agents within a post-merger integration
context and examines the implications of their
practices as they attempt to engage with others in a
cross-boundary information system implementation
project. We examine the case of the Metropolitan
Healthcare Center, where three previously
independent centers were merged into one, and
follow the individuals who were appointed to ensure
the integration of a new, mutual information system
across the three center sites. We draw on a practice
perspective and the notion of symbolic capital to shed
light on post-merger practices and their outcomes.
Our analysis suggests that one of the change agent’s
practices of boundary consolidation through
influence tactics were legitimized through discourses
of authoritative knowledge and ‘group-making’. This
facilitated the construction of symbolic boundaries
between the merging parties, thus contributing to the
resilience of pre-merger practices despite the
planned intention to create change.

1. Introduction
Post-merger integration (PMI) refers to the process of
value-creation that organizations anticipate from a
merger [16]. Despite the benefits that mergers can
yield, high failure rates have been reported [28, 33].
Indeed, the PMI phase is often beset by problems
such as high levels of employee stress [10], job
dissatisfaction and employee resistance [27,24], or
higher turnover intentions [29].
While employees’ resistance to PMI changes has
been considered one of the main causes of mergers’
failure to live up to their initial goals [24], the
literature on strategy stresses that examining how
change agents – that is individuals mandated by
upper management to implement PMI changes and to
ensure that these changes follow the strategic
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rationale [12, 18] – interpret and implement change
and how they construct their work environment can
shed light on some of the unintended outcomes of a
change process [1, 26].
When change agents are involved in change
initiatives across boundaries such as those called for
in post-merger integration, they are involved in
boundary spanning, defined as a practice that links an
organization or a business unit to its environment,
including other organizations with which it interacts
[23]. Their role, as change agents in such a context, is
to reconfigure, if not remove, boundaries so that
collaborative work will flow efficiently. In order to
realize their change objectives, change agents often
rely on influence tactics and use of networks [14],
coercion, and authoritative or supportive persuasion
[21]. The idea is that PMI change agents will
promote boundary spanning by using their relational
power within their respective organizations.
A merger often implies the implementation of
new information systems (IS) that will span across
previously independent organizations [27]. Research
has shown, albeit not in a PMI context, that the
success of IS implementation initiatives is highly
dependent on effective collaboration among
individuals [25]. Given the special context of the PMI
process, collaboration initiatives are likely to be
challenging since the actors involved abide by
different local, social and cultural rules emerging
from different pre-merger organizational context
delineated by pre-merger boundaries and actors’
interpretations of what is “at stake” for them [31]. In
such a context, the mandated change agents are
important organizational advocates for implementing
the new system.
However, despite targeted efforts, PMI change
processes sometimes fail or lead to unintended
outcomes. In fact, it has been shown that even change
agents might sometimes resist change and obstruct
collaboration efforts [18], despite their pronounced
mission to promote change. To shed more light on
this phenomenon and explore the relationship
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between post-merger practices and their outcomes we
investigate the questions: How do change agents use
influence tactics and what are the implications of
these practices on the outcomes of cross-boundary IS
projects in a PMI context?
Drawing on a practice perspective [2], we analyze
change agents’ utilization of symbolic capital during
the process of post-merger boundary reconfiguration.
We conduct a case study within a large metropolitan
healthcare center (MHC) that resulted from the
merger of three previously independent hospitals.
The case is an IS implementation project – from
project inception until the system was put in
production – carried out over a period of six years:
the ambulatory appointment information system
(AAIS).

2. The Practice Perspective and the Power
of Symbolic Capital
Within a given field of practice, agents are
distinguished by their status, which is characterized
by the accumulated amount of three types of
individual capital: economic capital (e.g., personal
finance), cultural capital (e.g., expertise) and social
capital (based on professional relationships) [2].
Agents can transform either of their capitals into a
fourth type, symbolic capital, which may give them
the ability to claim relevant knowledge or
authoritative knowledge [31]. According to Suchman
[25, p.142], authoritative knowledge can be described
as a knowledge that is “taken to be legitimate,
consequential, worthy of discussion, and useful for
justifying actions by people engaged in
accomplishing some concerted task”. Thus, symbolic
capital represents the ability to successfully define
reality, thereby shaping the practices of others. For
one to acquire symbolic capital, one must experience
a process of valuation [2]. In cross-boundary
collaboration, which is based on the possession of
intellectual, social, and economic capital, an agent’s
claims of authoritative knowledge must be perceived
as ‘valid’ by the audience, who then attributes
legitimacy to the agent. In this vein, the positions
agents occupy in a given field and the forms of
capital they possess matter, but only to the extent that
others in the situation value those positions and forms
of capital, converting them into a source of symbolic
power.
The differences in meanings and interests
between fields of practice are usually negotiated by
boundary spanners [4]. Boundary spanners may be
nominated or may emerge, but to be effective they
must be viewed as legitimate participants in the fields

of practice being spanned and recognized as
negotiators between fields, and they must be
motivated to act as negotiators [18]. However, as
Levina and Vaast [18] found in their study, some
boundary spanners may use their formal power to
obstruct the collaboration efforts across boundaries
and resist change.

2.1 Discursive Legitimation Strategies as
Explanation for Unintended Outcomes
Discursive legitimation represents symbolic capital
that emerges through a political rationalization
process of downplaying one's own interest and
making explicit the opponent's interest. In this view,
legitimacy or its opposite term, illegitimacy, are
created in relation to discourses that provide the
frames of mind with which individuals make sense of
particular situations. In the context of PMI,
legitimation, as creating a sense of positive,
acceptable status quo and delegitimation, as creating
a negative sense of change, may represent resistance
to change initiatives [28].
Discourses are persistent systems of thought
(including ideas, attitudes, beliefs and practices) that
enable and constrain what can be thought, said and
done [3]. In this study, we analyze two legitimation
discourses: 1) authoritative knowledge discourse
[25]; and 2) ‘group-making’ discourse [3]. We
operationalize them as symbolic capital-based
discourses [2] and as such, we view them as
discursive strategies through which senses of
legitimacy or illegitimacy are created.
The discourse of ‘group-making’ is characterized
by “logic of existence by delegation” or “by proxy”
[3]. The social reality, according to Bourdieu [3], can
be objectively divided into different social spaces, the
occupants of which are said to be sharing objective
similarities and thus constitute groups or classes. But,
Bourdieu argues, no real group exists without some
agent naming the group and therefore bringing it into
existence. Thus, a group exists or emerges when
there are agents capable of imposing themselves, who
are authorized to speak and act officially in its name.
In this view, the production and reproduction of
groups by creating symbolic boundaries is seen as
necessary during agents’ participation in struggles
over the classification and representation of
communities and represents an act of resistance to
any action that may affect the group structural
integrity. Symbolic boundaries are conceptual
distinctions made by organizational members to
acquire power status, monopolize resources,
categorize people and practices and generate feelings
of similarity and group membership [15].
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3. Methodology
This research was conducted as a case study, which
represents a research approach which focuses on
understanding the dynamics existing within single
settings [9]. In this way, the researcher is able to
identify emerging dimensions of the phenomenon
and the relationships that emerge from the study
through the researcher’s interaction with the
organization members within their context.

3.1 Research Context
We focus on one specific IS project, the development
of an ambulatory appointment information system
(AAIS) that was expected to enable the post-merger
integration of separate but similar site-based
departments (ambulatory services). The selected
organization was the Metropolitan Healthcare Center
(MHC – not the real name), a Canadian tertiary care
teaching institution. The MHC is the result of a
‘merger of equals’ of three independent teaching
hospitals with over 1 million patient visits per year:
two Adult hospitals (the Downtown and the
Midtown) and a Pediatric hospital. While the term
‘acquisition’ refers to the purchase of a target
organization for absorption into the acquiring
organization, in a ‘merger of equals’, merging parties
are considered full partners and when PMI
approaches do not reflect the pre-merger promises,
the result may be dissatisfaction and distrust.
The merger was initiated with the goal of creating
a mega-hospital to provide modern health care by
implementing a “best practices” approach for
coordinating care. In the pre-merger context, the
MHC hospitals developed their own sets of
applications, both for the clinical-administrative and
administrative application portfolios. Also, each
hospital center had its own medical patient index and
patient ID card, used several and separate patient
scheduling systems, managed beds and emergency
rooms according to the internal site perspective,
operated its own and distinct order entry and result
reporting system and produced statistics specific to
the patient stays within the specific center sites.
According to the MHC IS Strategic Plan, the
post-merger application portfolio needed to adapt to a
seamless, integrated organization that would result
from the redesign of the business processes. The
patients would have a single number and ID card
linked to a single record number used by all MHC
centers. According to the IS Project manager,
“because of the expected magnitude of the process
redesign”, keeping legacy systems in use was
considered to be an ineffective cost option. At the

outset of the AAIS project, the ambulatory services
managers from the three different centers were thus
enlisted in a project team to act as change agents and
enable the development and implementation of the
mutual system.

3.2 Data Collection
We conducted semi-structured interviews with the
persons who had held key roles in the project (see
Table 1). A total of 12 interviews (six interviewees in
two rounds of interviews) were performed. They
were based on a pre-designed protocol and lasted
between 30 and 45 minutes each. All interviews were
recorded and transcribed. The interviews were
supplemented by archival documents (e.g., strategic
planning sessions, management presentations, emails,
and communications planning), which offered a
source of triangulation for the themes that emerged
from the interview data. Due to their sensitive content
and the data privacy laws, we were allowed to
consult these documents only on site. These
documents were used in three ways.
Table 1. List of Interviewees
Function at the outset
of the project
Ambulatory Services
Manager (ASM)

Referred to
in the text as
Midtown
manager

Center

ASM

Downtown
manager

Downtown

ASM

Pediatric
manager

Pediatric

IS Project manager

IS Manager

MHC

IS Specialist
IS Specialist

Midtown

MHC
MHC

First, the various reports and presentations were used
to assist us in putting together the project’s
chronology, including identifying the dates of
important events and decision junctures. Second,
emails and management presentations were used to
formulate and refine interview questions. Third,
reports and meeting minutes were used to corroborate
and validate interview reports. Each interview was
semi-structured with both a structured interview
guide and room for unstructured questions. In a few
instances, when clarifications were required, followup questions were asked via phone or email.
Interview questions focused on understanding, from
the participant’s standpoint, the history of the project
collaboration practices, claims of relevant
knowledge, differences in system’s functionalities
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between the initial and the go-live phases of the
project, as well as the personal implications of the
merger. When no new information was revealed
during interviews, data collection was terminated.

3.3 Data analysis
The interview data were analyzed in an iterative
process [9] by cycling between data, emerging
themes, and relevant literature to develop a deeper
understanding of the dynamics of the cross-boundary
collaboration during the IS implementation process.
First, we created a provisional “start list” of codes
(Table 2) informed by our theoretical perspective
prior to the interviews. Second, the interview
transcripts were read carefully and relevant portions
highlighted. The highlighted portions were then
keyed into the database into a field called “evidence”
as chunks of rich text. All of the transcripts were
coded using the preliminary set of codes. In line with
our theory-building objective, we remained open to
emerging themes, which can lead to the creation of
new codes and categories when appropriate [20].
Thus, the key category of boundary consolidation
was created. Following this, we entered a new coding
iteration, going back to the transcripts and coding
them anew to take into account the new category. We
relied on authors’ agreement and consensus to
reconcile any coding disagreement.
Table 2. Coding Categories
Initial Coding List
Categories

Emerging Category

Differences in practices
Fields of practice
Boundaries
Cross-boundary collaboration
practices
IS design
Individual capital
Role of boundary spanners
Symbolic discourses
Boundary consolidation

4. Findings
From the outset, teamwork was organized by peerbased collaboration without a formal project manager
from the user side. The three managers soon realized
that they needed someone to follow up on decisions
after each meeting and act as a liaison with the IS
developers. The Pediatric center manager thus
emerged as the leader of the group because she was
the only one having worked in an IS implementation
project before. The other team members found her
charismatic, experienced and respected in her work
community. Retrospectively, the Pediatric manager

also saw herself, in the context of the project, as
being: “the spearhead … the catalyst… the person
that is the glue that holds this together and gives
direction, keeps people on track”. (Pediatric
manager) She considered herself a leader and found
it normal to take the lead in the implementation
process.
Team meetings involved exchanging clear
information about the needs of each member’s own
department in order to effectively negotiate and
convince the others of the need for specific system
features. The outcomes of these discussions were
often a compromise representing the result of various
claims of legitimate knowledge made by the manager
from the Pediatric center based on her past
experience in implementing clinical administrative
IS. During this period, the three managers were going
back to their centers and consulting with key players
in the clinics to make sure that the system that they
were trying to put together was in fact reflective of
what the clinics’ needs were. As the project
progressed, the Pediatric manager successfully
negotiated changes to the software functionality,
tailoring it to suit the needs of the Pediatric center.
While one of the goals of the pre-merger MHC
strategic plan was to implement a common set of
administrative practices, at the end of AAIS project,
MHC ambulatory services presented two different
sets of practices: one, at the Pediatric center, that
preserved pre-merger norms and another, at the two
Adult centers, that can be described as new practices
common to both entities.

4.1 Theme 1: The Emergence of Symbolic
Capital
Change agents in cross-boundary collaboration are
expected to bring expertise specific to their role to the
endeavor at hand. For example, in a new product
implementation effort, participants bring distinctive
expertise to shape the features, performance, and
production processes for the new product [5]. Their
distinction is accentuated by the fact that agents on
each side of the boundary have accumulated different
kinds of capital [2] and their respective fields of
practice may be significantly different. Each of the
three ambulatory service managers, who had worked
for several years in the three respective pre-merger
hospitals, were highly regarded by the upper
management, and had accumulated distinct
knowledge, experience and expertise in terms of
managing patient registration, appointments, waiting
lists, etc. In the first few months of the project, the
three managers had to share their knowledge of the
ambulatory procedures used in each of their centers.
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To their surprise, they realized that, even though
those site-based procedures seemed similar, their
execution varied from one field of practice to
another.
At the outset of the project, the three team
members were not aware of significant differences
between their practices due to the fact that they never
had to interact before.
“In the first three months, that knowledge
transfer, in terms of how they [the other centers] do it
versus how we [Downtown center] do it, it was a very
novel thing because you tend to think the way you do
things is the entire universe right and so it’s been a
wakeup call to discover that there are all kinds of
different ways of approaching the same process, the
same basic function” (Downtown manager)
Not only had they never met before, but they also
had never been involved in the development of a
similar IS.
“What we discovered was the way that the clinics
work at the Adult hospitals versus the Pediatric was
very, very different […] In fact a lot of the differences
between procedures… came along many times as a
result of discussions around the user group table
during the development […] As far as the Pediatric,
it is black box. I know a little bit because I take my
children there when they are sick, that’s it” (Midtown
manager)
Even though they were all officially employees of
the MHC, the fact that they were coming from
different hospitals and were now supposed to share
knowledge and develop a common system presented
some initial challenges:
“So it took us a little while to do that because
there was a group of people that had never met each
other before so figuring out a way to work together
was initially a bit of a challenge” (Midtown
manager); “Actually we didn’t know each other. We
had never met. I met [Downtown manager] there; I
had never met him before. You thought of yourself as,
I’m site specific” (Pediatric manager)
The case data show that the three center
managers, who were appointed as change agents and
boundary spanners by the upper management,
possessed significant amounts of social and
intellectual capital accumulated in time within their
fields of practice at the outset of the implementation
process. Even though the change agents had never
met before, they were aware of the other agents’
hierarchical position and had heard of their
professional reputation within their respective fields
of practice. They went through a quick process of
valuation of each other’s accumulated individual
capital at the outset of the project.

“[The Pediatric manager] was very quickly taken
on a leadership role… We all respected the hell out
of her. [The Downtown manager] was always in
there advocating for her clerks.” (Midtown manager)
“[The Midtown manager] was very good at
arguing the pros and cons of a certain functionality.”
(Pediatric manager)
“I would say [Midtown manager] for his
experience of how things worked at Midtown because
he’s been there a lot longer than me.” (Downtown
manager)
However, only the Pediatric manager tried and
successfully converted her accumulated intellectual
and social capitals into symbolic capital to claim
authoritative knowledge.
“Information Systems is my field of competence,
so it’s very easy to talk to a programmer. I provided a
good sort of leadership in that sense […] I had
fought for getting it for the Pediatric center, because
there’s nothing worse than implementing a new
system and losing functionality of the things you had
before […] I’m sure they [at the Adult centers] don’t
really care what system we have due to the fact that
the Pediatric clinics don’t need to communicate any
patient data to the Adult clinics. (Pediatric manager)
While during the project meetings most issues
were solved by an immediate consensus or through
persuasion based on trade-offs, in some rare instances
the Pediatric manager used her accumulated symbolic
capital to unilaterally make a decision. For example,
when she asked for a specific modular interface to be
built into the system, the Downtown manger didn’t
understand its utility for her center’s clinics. The
Pediatric manager notes that she tried to argue for her
need but to no avail:
“[Downtown manager] wouldn’t let go. She
couldn’t understand why we needed that, and at one
point it was like, look, I’m going to get it for the
[Pediatric], whether you understand or not, I’m
getting it” (Pediatric manager).

4.2 Theme 2: Resisting Change by Boundary
Consolidation
The Pediatric manager engaged in symbolic
discourses of ‘group-making’ that would present her
as an authorized voice to represent the Pediatric
population and its needs with respect to the
ambulatory clinics. She described the members of the
Pediatric field of practice as being completely
different from the members of the other centers of the
MHC and referred to herself as ‘we’ and ‘us’. During
the system implementation at the Pediatric center she
tried hard to classify her field of practice (Pediatric
ambulatory services) as being unique compared to the
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other two fields of practice in front of the other two
change agents and to refute any idea of integration.
“I think in terms of like structure and follow up
and whatever, I provided a good sort of leadership in
that sense. […] I have to say, we being, the Pediatric,
probably influenced a lot because the whole project
actually came from a needs analysis that we had
submitted […]. They moved Orthopedics from the
Downtown and centralized it at the Midtown. I think
they’ve redone some of their management structure
in terms of that. But that didn’t affect us. So the
Pediatric will remain independent” (Pediatric
manager)
Although the mandate of the change agents was to
entice the others to collaborate and alter the premerger boundaries, the Pediatric manager focused all
her efforts on what was “at stake”, protecting the
existing boundaries between her field of practice and
the rest of MHC. She used her symbolic capital to
promote the idea that Adult centers and the Pediatric
center were engaged in business processes that were
so different that they could not be integrated into the
same system. A specific type of data confidentiality
was one of her main arguments that the Pediatric
center was different from the two Adult centers and
due to its procedural and clinical differences her
center should never be integrated with the rest of the
MHC.
“You have convictions about the way certain
things should function or not. For example,
confidentiality of information is a big topic… For
example, ‘I’m calling, I’m in the middle of a divorce;
I don’t want my husband to know my phone number’.
So, the big question is how do you block that
information, are you able to flag it? So obviously for
us in Pediatric it’s a huge issue because we deal with
that kind of situation. On the adult side, not that
much.” (Pediatric manager)

On the one hand, the Pediatric manager thought that
the Pediatric center should keep its clinical practice
independence, while the main administrative
functions, such as Finance and HR would be fully
integrated in the structures of the MHC. Pediatric
manager was convinced that the development of the
new AAIS had more to do with implementing a
system that would make the management of the
ambulatory services more efficient, than with the
merger. Thus, she tried to convey the message that it
was in the Adult centers’ interest to concentrate on
their own clinical data.
“I’m pretty sure they [Adult centers] don’t really
care what system we have due to the fact that the
Pediatric clinics don’t need to communicate any
patient data with the clinics on the Adult side of the
MHC.” (Pediatric manager)
By using a mixed symbolic ‘group-making’ and
claims of relevant knowledge that skewed the
existing power dynamics within the project team, the
Pediatric manager was able to reproduce the Pediatric
hospital’s old, resilient practices into the system
configuration. Therefore, at the end of the
implementation project, the resulting common AAIS
had two database instances, one for the Pediatric
center, which enabled the preservation of the premerger practices and another one for the Adult
centers that enabled new common administrative
practices. At the end of the project, the boundary
between the Pediatric and the rest of the MHC
centers in terms of ambulatory services were still up
instead of having been erased, which would have
been the logical outcome of the PMI process.
Figure 1 illustrates this process of boundary
consolidation.

Planned common best practices

AAIS
Pediatric
instance

Pre-merger
Pediatric
practices
Change agents’
collaboration
Pre-merger
Adult
practices
practices

Valuation of
Pediatric
manager’s
symbolic capital
and authoritative
knowledge

Triggers
consolidation
of fields
boundaries
AAIS Adult
instance

Outset: Unknown differences in practices
(boundaries between fields of practice)

Outcome: ‘Group-making’ discourse-based
resistance to change by consolidating boundaries

Figure 1: The process of boundary consolidation
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“I would say we [Adult centers] are now reaching
the point of blend I suppose because we’re trying to
take best practice from each center [adult] and
putting it together […], but as far as I’m aware, the
Pediatric is standalone” (IS manager)

5. Discussion
We report the findings of a case study of an IS
implementation project aimed at unifying the
ambulatory practices of a large healthcare center that
resulted from the merging of three hospitals and
supporting them with a unique, mutual information
system. In this project, three department managers
were appointed as center-based team leaders and
nominated as change agents and boundary spanners.
The case focuses on the interactions between the
three managers and specifically shows how one of
the department managers, the Pediatric manager,
successfully used her symbolic capital to make
claims of authoritative knowledge. This in term led to
the consolidation of pre-merger boundaries and
legitimized the exclusion of her department from the
merging exercise.
This boundary reinforcement represents an
unintended outcome of an intended organizational
change imposed by a merger. The Pediatric manager
instead of acting as a change agent actually acted as a
boundary consolidator by engaging in discourses of
authoritative knowledge [25], and ‘group-making’ [3]
that facilitated her actions. Based on symbolic
discourses, boundary consolidation represents a
means for resisting the change brought in by a
merger. The two discourses represent the basis for
making claims about specific actions of boundary
spanners. While these discourses are not specific to
an organizational context, the events that triggered
them in our case study are specific to a post-merger
integration environment.
These symbolic discourses were necessary for the
Pediatric manager to represent her field of practice
during the struggle over classifying the Pediatric
center as being unique and its environment not being
ready to be included within the MHC. The existence
of a relationship between the Pediatric manager’s
discursive strategy and her use of the accumulated
symbolic capital pointed to the fact that the Pediatric
manager pursued not only individual, but also
collective interests to resist the change in practices.
The Pediatric manager’s collective representations
inculcated the reality of the existing boundaries
between the Pediatric center and the Adult centers as
something that could not be changed during the
process of system implementation. It also threatened

to trigger “power dynamics that undermine
collaboration” [19, p. 310]. The Pediatric manager
mixed symbolic group-making and claims of relevant
knowledge that skewed the existing power dynamics
within the project team and helped her justify the way
the system was configured (reflecting pediatric center
pre-merger practices).

5.1 Contribution #1: Change agent as resistor
By addressing the boundary spanning literature, the
main contribution of this study relates to the
theoretical development of a practice perspectivebased discursive analysis of the outcomes of a crossboundary IS integration process in a PMI context,
which includes the concept of boundary
consolidation. The Pediatric manager illustrates what
Levina and Vaast [18, p. 356] describe as a boundary
spanner with symbolic capital who deliberately “fails
to develop an interest in developing a new joint
field”. The actions of the Pediatric manager suggest
that sometimes change agents use their symbolic
capital to reinforce existing boundaries and obstruct
boundary spanning, when personal or local interests
are at stake. Thus, instead of being an agent that
promotes change, the agent reinforces existing
boundaries. Boundary reinforcement or consolidation
encompasses the ways in which an individual,
member of a professional community (in our case a
field of practice) internally sets and reclaims its
boundaries by increasing member awareness of
boundaries and emphasizing community identity
[11].
In the AAIS study, the Pediatric manager, who
was mandated by the MHC upper management to
implement PMI changes and remove boundaries for
collaboration by bridging cognitive and knowledge
gaps across the pre-merger boundaries, did exactly
the opposite by reinforcing the fences between the
Adult centers and the Pediatric center. Indeed, instead
of focusing on commonalities and dependencies
between the three sites, the Pediatric manager’s
efforts and energy were invested in highlighting the
differences (e.g. children vs. adult patients, no
information exchange between the Pediatric and the
Adult centers) as well as the uniqueness of the
Pediatric center (e.g. in terms of procedures, clerical
tasks, etc.). The Pediatric manager’s forerunner
attitude as well as her legitimacy, based on her
charisma, her experience and her reputation, enabled
her to mobilize support around the idea that the
Pediatric center on one side and the Adult centers on
the other, had different ways of working and required
different AAIS. She was able, through her
authoritative knowledge and ‘group-making’
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discourses, to redefine the “initial” strategic rationale
of the AAIS and alter the project team’s reality by
causing the project to deviate from its original
objective of an integrated system to finally end up
with the development of two separated AAIS. Thus,
the Pediatric manager did not play the change agent
role as it would have initially been expected by the
upper management, but a boundary consolidator one.
As a result of the actions of the Pediatric
manager, the practices of the Pediatric hospital center
remained resistant to change. Earlier research has
suggested that suggested that change agents may
inhibit wider adoption of a new system that would
facilitate change of practices [22], since potential
users perceive the new system as “for nominated
boundary spanners to decide how to use” rather than
“for everybody to use” [18, p. 357]. Rivard and
Lapointe [21] proposed a taxonomy of responses
which could be used to react to resistance: 1) Inaction
(unawareness, deliberate ignorance, and impotence),
2) Acknowledgement, 3) Rectification (congruent vs.
non-congruent) and 4) Dissuasion (coercion,
authoritative persuasion, supportive persuasion).
However, in the AAIS case study, the Pediatric
manager used discursive strategies akin to some of
the responses proposed by Rivard and Lapointe [21],
not to react to resistance, but to consolidate the
boundaries between the Adult and Pediatric fields of
practice. Indeed, the Pediatric manager through
various discursive strategies, tried to modify the
project’s initial strategic rationale by highlighting the
differences between the fields of practice and
persuade the rest of the project team that the project
outcome would be better represented by two
separated systems. Such strategies are similar to the
non-congruent rectification and persuasion responses
proposed by Rivard and Lapointe [21]. Thus, in our
study we found that the Pediatric manager instead of
using her symbolic capital to diminish boundaries,
she strengthened them by acting as a boundary
consolidator.

5.2 Contribution #2: The Role of Symbolic
Capital in Consolidating Boundaries
Empirically, this paper enhances our understanding
of discursive legitimation during the process of PMI
by identifying two symbolic discourses, authoritative
knowledge and ‘group-making’ that lead to the
reinforcement of the pre-merger boundaries in the
case of the Pediatric center. Our study also suggests
that in a specific context such as mergers, some
change agents will use their individual capital to
interfere with planned change by engaging in

legitimation discourses to consolidate existing
boundaries.
In the AAIS case study, the Pediatric manager
used her symbolic capital and took advantage of the
fact that the first beta testing to configure the AISS
was implemented at the Pediatric center, to submit
change requests to adjust/modify the software
package’s functionalities. These changes were meant
to reflect Pediatric center’s pre-merger practices
without considering the Adult centers’ contexts and
specific needs. These change requests were part of
the Pediatric manager’s discursive strategies to
separate the Pediatric ambulatory practices from the
rest of the MHC. One possible explanation of
Pediatric manager playing the role of a boundary
consolidator may stem from the fact that she was
simultaneously playing two opposing roles. As a
member of the project team, she played a change
agent role; individuals “responsible for identifying
the need for change, creating a vision and specifying
a desired outcome, and then making it happen” [12,
p. 362] and, as the ambulatory service manager, she
played a change recipient role; individuals “who are
responsible for implementing, adopting, or adapting
to the change(s).” [12, p. 362]. The Pediatric manager
was both the implementer and the recipient of
change. As a change agent, she was formally
designated to implement the PMI changes and ensure
that the potential turbulences caused by such major
organizational change would not affect the main goal
of the project, that is, having a cross-boundary
integrated system. However, as a change recipient,
she was responsible to adapt the new practices
imposed by the new AAIS on the Pediatric
ambulatory service as well as minimize the
prospective disruptions brought to the Pediatric local
practices. To do so, the Pediatric manager used her
symbolic capital and various discursive strategies to
demonstrate that, the Pediatric center was different
and that status quo should be maintained. Thus, it is
possible that her dual status might have helped her
consolidate the boundaries around the Pediatric
center.

5.3 Contribution #3: Strategies to Consolidate
Boundaries
Our study enriches the existing explanations of how
and why intended strategies sometimes lead to
unintended consequences [1]. Research drawing on
socio-cognitive theories had already examined the
role of social interactions [7] and past experience as
sources of collective understanding, which may
ultimately affect the outcome of an organizational
change [32]. These theories contend that individuals’
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thoughts about IT-led change are not formed in
isolation but based on collectively shared
understandings of what the technology is or how the
technology can affect their practices. In this sense,
Balogun and Johnson [1] suggest that unanticipated
consequences are the result of organizational actors
creating mental frameworks of references useful for
the interpretation of reality through social
interactions. In the AAIS case study, one strategy
used by the Pediatric manager to alter the project
team’s mental framework was by voicing issues [8].
An issue is a “subjective ‘chunk of knowledge’
enacted by a stakeholder in a particular place and
time within the project” [30, p. 46] and can be
conceptualized as “knowledge at a boundary”. Issues
can also be considered as vehicle for knowledge
transfer, transaction and transformation, which will
affect boundaries. Issues that have high levels of
commonality and dependency between stakeholders
should weaken boundaries whereas issues with low
levels of commonality and dependencies should
consolidate boundaries [30]. Also, as issues are
intertwined with the stakeholders’ legitimacy and
symbolic capital, some of them will have more
influence than others. In the AAIS project, the
Pediatric manager relied on her symbolic capital to
ensure that the issues that she voiced would be
considered as authoritative knowledge. She also
voiced issues that would minimize the possible
commonalities between the Pediatric center’s
practices and those of the Adult centers’ in order to
consolidate the boundaries between the three MHC
sites. Thus, our study provides a practice lens and an
issue management perspective on why and how
social processes of interaction between managers
engaged in making sense of intended changes may
lead to unintended outcomes.

6. Conclusion and Limitations
This study examines the practices of appointed
change agents in a PMI cross-boundary IS
implementation project and highlights their use of
influence tactics to promote or resist change. We
show that when personal or local interests are at
stake, sometimes change agents use their symbolic
capital to reinforce existing boundaries and obstruct
boundary spanning. The process is based on other
actors’ valuation of the change agent’s symbolic
capital and authoritative knowledge, something
which may serve to legitimize boundary
consolidation instead of boundary spanning. Thus,
instead of being an agent that promotes change, the
agent reinforces existing boundaries. As such, this

study extends previous studies on boundary spanning
[18] by introducing the concept of boundary
consolidation and adds to the existing explanations of
how intended strategies sometimes lead to
unintended consequences [1]. The case study also
provides rich data documenting the challenges
organizations face when they try to merge fields of
practice and support them with a common
information system.
The main limitation of this study might be that it
attempts at generalizing only from empirical
statements to theoretical statements from a case study
[17]. However, it has been shown that statistical,
sampling-based generalizability may be an unsuitable
goal for qualitative studies [6]. The MHC case is
built on a strong historical foundation and deals with
issues of central importance to our research which
makes it purposeful. Learning from this case can now
be transferred to other contexts for further
refinements that eventually will offer statistical
generalizability. Looking at industry level data and
data from other settings may help overcome this
limitation and provide new understandings.
The theoretical explanation offered here opens up
avenues for more in-depth explorations of some of
the more complex processes associated with the
dynamic relationship between the change agents and
IT-enabled organizational change. Future studies
should assess in more depth how the actors involved
in cross-boundaries IS projects interact and how the
nature of these interactions affects the outcomes of
the projects. In this vein, an explanatory-based
theorization by identifying social mechanisms, that is
processes composed of actions, events and “chains or
aggregations of actors confronting problem situations
and mobilizing more or less habitual responses” [13,
p. 368], would explain the intermediate events that
would partially influence the evolution from an initial
state of a phenomenon to a final observed outcome.
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